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rN THE SUPREME COURT 
0'F THE STATE OF UTAH 
TIME COMMERCrAL FINANCING CORr., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff~Respondent, 
vs. 
CAROL BRIMHALL, WILLIAM HESTERMAN, 
STEPHEN D. SCI:IDLTZ and BRU1HALL . 
PRODUCTS, INC., a corporation, and 
4-SPECTRA, INC., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Administrator with the Will annexed 
of the Estate of Ray s. Brimhall, 
deceased, 
vs. 
Defendant~Appellant 
and Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
BRIMCO HYDRAULICS & ENGINEERrNG, 
INC., a corporation, JOHN B. 
FAIRBANKS, JR., and WESTERN RESEARCH 
AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY, 
Third Party 
Defendants. 
Case No. 16167 
---~--------~------~-----~~----~-~~------------------------------
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NATURE Of THE CASE 
This action is a post judgment contract dispute in 
which Walker Bank and others seek to recover the money (_royalties} 
awarded oy the Trial Court as compensation for the exclusive 
patent License awarded to TIMEC0 1 and in which Walker Bank 
seeks enforcement of a Trial Court judgment and the decision 
of this Supreme Court in a prior appeal in this action, 
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
On October 24, 1978 1 the Trial Court entered an 
Order granting a Hotion for Summary Judgment by which the 
question of whether or not Walker Bank was to receive its money 
(royalties} was dismissed as a federal question without holding 
the evidentiary hearing earlier mandated by this Court. 
Simultaneously, the Trial Court refused to enforce its own 
Decree of July 30, 1975 through which it imposed a contract 
on the parties requiring payment of money (yoyalties) by the 
plaintiff TIMECO to Walker Bank and Carol Brimhall Davis, the 
defendants and appellants herein, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants-appellants seek reversal of the Trial 
Court's decision dismissing the question of whether or not 
royalties are due and a mandate directing the Trial Court to 
act to enforce its own Decree of July 30, 1975, to promptly 
conduct the evidentiary hearing heretofore mandated by this 
-1-
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Court on the issue of whether or not TIJviECO is obligated to 
Walker Bank and Carol Brimhall Davis for past unpaid royalties 
and on the issue of contempt, hut not including the issue of 
patent validity. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The appellants herein are defendants below, Walker 
Bank & Trust Company, Administrator with the Will annexed of 
the Estate of Ray S, Brimhall, deceased (_hereinafter referred 
to as "Walker Bank") and Carol Brimhall Davis (hereinafter 
referred to as "Davis"). 
The respondent and cross-appellant is TIME COMMERCIAL 
FINANCING, CORP, which is hereinafter referred to as "TTHECO", 
The cross-respondents are Walker Bank, Davis and 
Brimhall Products, Inc. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case has a lengthy history dating back before 
1~71, The factual background is thus broken down into appro-
priate time frames and other subjects. 
Pre-Liti!iatioh (_1"965 to 1971) 
In 1965 and 1967, RayS, Brimhall invented first 
a hydraulic valve and system and then a mechanical latch for 
use on trucks described in more detail hereafter CR-601), 
The products were made and sold eventually by Brimco Hydraulics 
and Engineering, Inc,, a corporation (BRH1CO} 01-med by Ray 
-2-
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Brimh_all and his partner (R~599l, Ray Brimhall died in November 
of lg6g. CR~602l, 
After Ray Brimhall's death, BRJMCO obtained financing 
from TIJ:!ECO CR-6131 and eventually defaulted on its obligations 
to pay back the loan CR-6151, TINECO thereafter foreclosed 
on security positions and purchased the "collateral" at a public 
sale in March, 1971 (_R-618), 
The fnitial Dispute (1971) 
At the time of the sale in March, 19 71, Walker Bank, 
as administrator, (R-601} claimed ownership of Ray Brimhall's 
inventions which then were in the form of an issued U,S, Patent 
and a pending u.s. Patent Application (R-619}, TrMECO took 
issue with Walker Bank and commenced this action claiming total 
ownership of the patent and patent applicaion (R-3}. Later, 
TINECO added a claim against Walker Bank, Ray Brimhall's widow 
(now Carol Brimhall Davis), Brimhall Products, Inc, and others 
for damages on the theory that the ownership rights of TIMECO 
had been derogated or subverted, That claim was principally 
based on the granting of a patent license by Walker Bank to 
Brimhall Products, Inc,, which was a company set up by Carol 
Brimhall (Ray Brimhall's widowl and others to make and sell 
products under the patents (_R-9gl, 
The Tri:al And Its 
Outcome 0·9n-19'7Sl 
The issue of ownership of the patent and patent 
application 1vas tried to the Court without a jury in January, 
-3-
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1972, witQ remaining issues reserved by severance for later 
disposition. After tQe trial and exhaustive post trial liti-
gation, tQe Trial Court eventually entered Amended Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree (R-599-6261 on July 
30, 1975. 
As per the Amended Decree, tQe Trial Court found 
th.at TU1ECO -did: not own the patent and patent application for 
Ray Brimhall's inventions (R-6021~ It found rather that owner-
ship 1v-as in l'falker Bank (as administrator of Ray Brimhall's 
Estate) subject to implied contract rights in the form of an 
implied exclusive license which TU1ECO had acquired at the 
foreclosure sale (R-602-6191. The Trial Court found that the 
license carried th.e ooligation to pay royalties, and that TH!ECI 
was so obligated (R-609-R-619}. The Findings and Conclusions 
were properly implemented in the Decree (R-624). 
Post Judgment (19"76-19 78} 
In December, 1976, Walker Bank and Carol Brimhall, 
now Carol Brimhall Davis, instituted post judgment proceedings 
to obtain judgment for royalties due under the Decree which 
THIECO refuses to pay. Th.e proceedings 1v-ere commenced by an 
Order to Shmi Cause (R-710.}. It is the disposition of that 
Order to Show Cause dated December 8, 1976, which provides the 
legal and factual premise of this appeal. 
1. Initial Resolution of 
Order To Show Cause (19 ;6} 
On December 22, 1976, the Trial Court had a hearing 
-4-
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to resolve the Order to Show Cause CR~7261 and TIMECO's counter 
motion to vacate it (R-7141. By minute entry or Memorandum 
Decision dated January 24, 1977, the Trial Court found that 
lvalker Bank and Davis were entitled to the unpaid royal ties 
and ordered that further proceedings be had to set the amount 
due (R-7S41. This order was much later formalized·~~ 
tunc (R-868}. 
2. The First Appeal (1977} 
TrMECO took exception to the Trial Court's Ruling 
of January 24, 1977 and eventually appealed to this Court 
claiming it was denied due process of law because it was 
precluded from presenting the Trial Court with additional 
evidence (R-8101. 
This Court ruled that the record below did not have 
sufficient evidence to support the ruling of January 24, 1977. 
This Court then remanded for further proceedings (Appeal No. 
15136, Opinion filed February 10, 1978), 
3. Simultaneous With Appeal (19 7 7) 
Through the summer of 1977, simultaneous with the 
appeal process, TrMECO initiated and pursued proceedings in 
the Trial Court to obtain resolution of then still unresolved 
causes which had been severed and reserved since 1972 (R-8791. 
Walker Bank and Davis responded with a Motion foT Summary 
Judgment on the severed causes (R-932}. Nothing was resolved 
because a stay of all Trial Court proceedings was obtained 
by TIMECO on October 4, 19 77 (R-1114}. 
-5-
... 
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Post Appeal (1978) 
After remittitur in April 1978 (_R-11251, THIECO filed 
its second !lotion for Summary Judgment of Patent Invalidity 
on April 28, 1~78(~-1130)" Its first Motion had been presented 
and denied (R-564-581) before entry of the final Amended Decree 
of July 30, 1g75o TINECO's second motion and Walker Bank's 
unresolved 1977 Motion for Summary Judgment on the untried 
causes were heard by the Trial Court on June 26, 19780 
The Trial Court granted Walker Bank's ~lotion for 
Summary Judgment by dismissing THIECO' s earlier severed and 
still untried causes on the grounds set forth by Walker Bank 
that the causes sound in patent infringement and are thus a 
federal question (R-12 71) o Further, THIECO 1 s ~lotion for Summary 
Judgment of Patent Invalidity was denied, 
Thereafter, THIECO filed a ~lotion for Summary Judgment 
to dismiss Walker Bank's claim for unpaid royal ties w·hlch \'las 
raised by the December 8, 19;6 Order to Show Cause (R-1282), 
In the alternative, TDlECO sought an order to force l<falker 
Bank into ne,,-ly authori;:ed Patent Office proceedings to revie" 
the issue of validity (R-1285}. 
The Trial Court refused to order Patent Office pro-
ceedings but did grant TDIECO' s :lotion for Summary Judgment 
to dismiss, and in fact dismissed the question of 1;hether 
ro;·alties under the July 3Cl, 19~5 i)ecree are to be paid on 
the grounds that it is a federal question CR-134~}. 
1'\alker 3ank thereafter took this appeal hen that 
order and separate!;- sought :iandarms as KelL The ~lanciar1us 
-6-
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proceedings 1.-ere dismissed in favor of this Appeal, rn the 
interim, TriECO filed a cross appeal claiming error in other 
parts of the Trial Court's ruling if the Trial Court is re-
versed, 
Th:e ·products 
The products involved in the dispute are for use 
on the large semi-truck tractors of the type which have the 
cab mounted over the engine so that the cab must be tipped 
forward to provide access to the engine for maintenance, The 
hydraulic system and valve are used to port oil to a hydraulic 
tilting piston or cylinder from a manually operated hand pump, 
The valve also ports hydraulic fluid to a cab latch. 
The cab latch operates to latch the cab of :he semi-
truck tractor down in normal use, It is construc:e~ :: 'lave 
a spring to improve the "ride" experienced by the driver, 
The hydraulic system overcomes the spring and unlatches it 
so that the cab can be tilted. 
Frequent reference is had to a "Silver Latch" and 
a "Black Latch", These terms relate to the actual color of 
constructed cab latches, The "Silver Latch" (Exhibit D-2) 
is one for which TH!ECO admits royalties are due, and has in 
fact been paying royal ties thereon, The "Black Latch" (.E:xhlbi t 
D-ll is claimed by TH!ECO to be an improvement latch and suf-
ficiently different to not be under license, TU!ECO is not 
paying royalties on the "Black Latch", 
Frequent reference is also had to the "Brimhall Latch" 
-7-
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and to a "Nordell-Kimhall Latch'', The Brimhall Latch is the 
same as the Silver Latch; and the Black Latch is the same as 
the Nordell-Kimhall Latch, 
The Patents 
There are three patents which have been frequently 
referred to during the course of these proceedings: 
Cal U.S. Patent No, 3,430,653, issued March 
4, 1969, was invented by Ray S, Brimhall and is 
directed to the hydraulic valve and system used for 
tipping the cabs, 
COl U,S, Patent No, 3,797,882, issued March 
19, 1974, to Walker Bank (as Administrator} was 
invented by Ray s. Brimhall and is directed to the 
latch used to hold the cab of the semi-truck tractor 
in place. This patent was pending before the Patent 
Office at the outset of this matter, but has obviously 
now issued as a patent, 
(cl U,S. Patent No, 3,752,519, issued August 
14, 1973, to R, Nordell and H, C, Kimball, The patent 
is not admitted into evidence, It is sometimes 
referred to hy TIMECO as the Nordell-Kimball patent, 
Su .. Tfliifart of the 
factua D:Lspute 
Into UL7S, THIECO resisted paying any royalties. 
TIMECO had even obtained a Temporary Restraining Order from 
Judge Ritter to avoid payment, Hm-rever, eventually TINECO 
-8-
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was compelled to and did pay royalties on the Silver Latch. 
About that time, it started to make a slightly different latch 
known as the Black Late~ TIMECO has continued to pay royalties 
on the Silver Latch and has refused and continues to refuse 
to pay royalties on the Black Latch. Walker Bank 1 as Admin-
istrator, and Carol Brimhall Davis, the widow and heir, started 
post judgment proceedings to collect royalties on the Black 
Latch. The amount of accrued royalties due with interest is 
estimated to nolv substantially exceed $50,000.00. 
TD1ECO has refused to pay basically because it claims 
the Brimhall Latch patent is invalid and because it claims 
that the Black Latch does not infringe the claims of the Brimhall 
Latch patent. 
Walker Bank and Davis, however, assert that validity 
can no longer be raised in this case and that even if it could 
the patent is valid. ~'{alker Bank and Davis further assert that 
the Black Latch is a royalty-bearing latch which does infringe 
the Brimhall Latch patent. The question of infringement centers 
on the way the latch hook moves as it travels between latched 
and unlatched positions. 
Summ:arb of The 
te·gallspute 
The legal dispute which is the predicate of this 
appeal relates to two separate aspects of this case. 
The first deals with the claim of Walker Bank and 
TINECO for past unpaid royalties. TU1ECO urged the Trial Court 
-9-
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to dismiss t~e claim as a federal question in the face of clear 
aut~ority that the State Court can entertain issues of infringe-
ment in resolving State Court claims of the type here involved" 
Tli..e Trial Court adopted TIHEC0 1 s view and dismissed the question, 
Walker Bank and Davis appeal now to reverse that decision. 
T~e second aspect relates to TIMEC01s earlier severed 
and untried causes. T~e gist of those causes is that the defen-
dants derogated patent rights owned by TIMECO. The Trial Court 
dismissed the causes, inter alia, because they sound like and 
are a patent infringement cause exclusively under Federal 
jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
T~e Trial Court erred in dismissing the question 
of whether royalties are due on the Black Latch as a federal 
question. The Trial Court erred because the question on its 
face is clearly a State Court issue properly in a State Court 
under compelling authority. T~e Trial Court erred because 
it ~as a duty to enforce its own judgment, which is the predi-
cate for the question and the basis upon which it is founded" 
The Trial Court erred because it refused or failed to follow 
the mandate of this Court in an earlier first appeal in this 
action. 
TBE TRIAL COURT HAS A DUTY TO ENFORCE 
ITS OWN JUDGMENT AND Sl:lOULD BE COHPELLED TO SO ACT 
It has long been the law of the State of Utah that 
-10-
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tQe enforcement of a judgment is a duty of the District Court. 
Ketchem Coal Co.· v. Cllris·tehsen et al, 48 UtaQ 214, 159. Pac. 
541 (l!H6l. 
In Ketchem Coal, ·supra, tQe plaintiff coal company, 
by condemnation proceeding, obtained an order or judgment giving 
it possession and occupancy of a strip of ground for purposes 
of building a tramway to transport coal to a nearoy rail line. 
The defendants thereafter interferred with the construction 
of the tramway. The plaintiff thus asked the District Court 
for, and the District Court did issue, an order to show cause 
why the defendants tQerein SQOuld not be made to comply with 
the judgment and why tQe defendants SQould not be Qeld in 
contempt. The defendants demurred to the order; and the Trial 
Court sustained the demurrer. 159 Pac. at 542. 
In mandamus proceedings filed in this Court, the 
plaintiff coal company sought a writ compelling the District 
Court to enforce its judgment. In ordering that the writ issue, 
this Court stated: 
The Ju-dgment fn Tnis Case 
The judgment or order Qere at issue is the Amended 
-ll-
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Decree of July 3U, lg7s, by the Honorable James S, Sawaya in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, A copy 
of that judgment is affixed to this Brief as Exhibit I. The 
pertinent part of that judgment is paragraph 3 which provides 
that: 
11 3, , , , (TINECO) is the owner of an implied 
exclusive license under,,.(the Brimhall Patents),., 
In return for said license, ,,.(TINECO) ••• is obli-
gated to pay l'falker Bank ••• royal ties in the arcount 
of two percent (2%} of total sales of Valve Systems 
and Cab Latch.es and parts thereof. ,.,", 
Reque·sr To Enforce Judgment 
By ex parte motion dated December 6, 1976, supported 
by affidavits, Davis and Walker Bank asked the Court to and 
the Court did issue its Order To Sh.ow Cause, dated December 
9, 1976, directing TH1ECO to appear and show cause why judgment 
sh.ould not be entered in favor of Walker Bank against TH!ECO 
for past unpaid royalties, 
The petitioners herein have thus requested enforcement 
of the judgment in the same manner and on the same basis as 
the plaintiff in Ketchum Coal, supra, Indeed, Walker Bank 
and Davis have repeatedly and strenuously requested enforcement 
since December 1976, 
Refusa:l T'o Enfor-ce Jud!'m:ent_ 
On October 24, 1978, upon motion by TillE CO, the Trial 
Court, ny Judge Sawaya, dismissed the question of whether 
royalties are due on the "Black Latch" on the grounds that 
-12-
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the question is to be resolved in the Federal courts, The 
Trial Court has thus refused to enforce its o\m judgment. 
The Trial Court has refused erroneously to act in accordance 
with its clear duty. The Trial Court has no discretion, 
The Trial Court must act on the merits of the request to enforce 
the Judgment of July 30, 1975, 
Tt Is Pro·per To Compel The 
Ir~al Court To Act 
This Court iri Ketchum Coal Co, v; Chr-istensen, 
supra, found that it was proper to compel a district court 
judge to proceed,.to act,.,to enforce his o1m judgment. The 
situation here presented is virtually on all fours with Ketchum 
Coal, This Court may and should compel the District Court 
to act to determine if the facts support enforcement and to 
thereafter enforce or not enforce the Judgment, 
A Federal Question 
Is Not Involved 
The basis for the Trial Court's decision is that 
the question of whether or not royalties are due is a federal 
question. It appears that the Trial Court concluded that it 
may or should examine whether or not the accused royalty-bearing 
Black Latch fits within the claims of the Brimhall Latch Patent, 
It further appears that the Trial Court concluded such an 
inquiry is federal, 
The conclusion is erroneous. It cannot· ipso ~ 
be a federal question to determine the scope of a state court 
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judgment and liability for damages and contempt thereunder, 
Further, it is clear under well established authority that 
the inquiry which the Trial Court thought to be exclusively 
federal is not exclusively federal and is a proper subject 
for the Trial Court, fnfra,, at page 16, 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS A DUTY 
TO FOLLOW THE PRIOR APPEAL DECISION 
OF THIS COURT AND HAY BE COMPELLED TO SO ACT 
It is the law of the State o£ Utah that a Trial Court 
must follow the decision of this Supreme Court upon remand 
or remittitur after appeaL Street v, Fo·urth Jud-icial District 
Court, ·--Utah __ , 191 P, Zd 153 (1948}; Utah Copper Co, 
v, Distr·ic·t Court of Third Judi-cial District, 91 Utah 377, 
64 P,Zd 241 (1937), As stated by this Court in Utah Copper 
"The rule is well established and there does 
not seem to be anything tv the contrary that when 
a case has been determined by a reviewing court and 
remanded to the trial court, 'the ·duty of the latter 
is to com~ly with the mandate of the former," 64 
P,Zd at 2 a (emphasis added}, 
This language was cited with approval in Street v, Fourth 
Judicial District Court, supra, 191 P,Zd at 157, 
The Prior Decision 
Of This Court 
TIMECO took appeal in April 1977, The Decision and 
Opinion of this Court was filed in Appeal No. 15136 on February 
10, 1978. In that Decision and Opinion, this Court noted the 
nature of the proceedings and held that: 
-14-
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"The record before us is totally devoid of 
evidence and does not and cannot support the findings 
below. 
"The judgment of January 24 1 1~77 is reversed 
and remanded for further proceed~ngs in accord with 
this opinion." Decision and Opinion filed February 
lG, 1978, at page 3, 
The Decision and Opinion is unambiguous and clear. 
It directs further proceedings in accordance with the decision. 
Those proceedings are clearly to be evidentiary proceedings 
to resolve the issue of liability for royalties on the "Black 
Latch". No other issue was extant in that appeal. TIMECO, 
in its Appeal Brief (undated}, stated quite clearly that the 
relief sought in that appeal was: 
" ••• reversal of an order to pay royalties ••• 
and.,.remand to the lower court to consider addi-
tional evidence." Appellant's Appeal Brief, Appeal 
No. 15136, at page 2. 
This Court granted that relief and remanded with 
a specific direction to proceed. 
The Law- o·f This 
Case Is Settled 
The appeal taken by THIECO and the decision rendered 
by this Court has established the law of this case. As stated 
by this Court in Utah Copper Co. v. 1Jistrict Cour·t of the 
Thlr·a Judicia:11Jistrict, supra: 
"Whateve:r comes hefore and is decided and dis-
posed of by the reviewing court is considered as 
finally settled and the inferior court is bounaoy 
tKe decree as the law of the ·case and must carry 
it into execution accord~ng to tKe mandate,..". 
64 P. 2 d at 2 SO. 
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'-'Th.e mandate :ls binding on the lower court and 
must ne strictly ~allowed and carried into effect 
according to its true intent and meaning," 64 Po2d 
at 25U, 
Under th.e law of th.e case doctrine in this matter, 
the only action left to be taken was the setting of an evi-
dentiary hearing, th.e taking of TIMEC0 1 s additional evidence 
and the rendering of a decision. The law of this case could 
permit no other actiono All issues pertaining to the post-
judgment enforcement proceedings were available to be raised 
by TIMECO on December 22, 1976, and were available to be raised 
on the appeal then taken. They were not. The sole issue argued 
on appeal was TUIECO's right to put on additional evidenceo 
That right was granted and is the settled law of this caseo 
The Tr-ial Court Has Refused 
To Follow The Dec1s1on And 
Op1h1on b£ 'this Court 
On October 24, 1978, the Trial Court, by the Honorable 
James So Sawaya, entered an order dismissing the question of 
whether royalties were due on the "Black Latch" without an 
evidentiary hearing and on erroneous grounds by which juris-
diction over the question was disclaimed. The Trial Court 
thus failed and refused to follow the Decision and Opinion 
of this Court rendered in Appeal Noo 15136o 
THE DISMISSAL Of THE QUESTION 
OF TIMECO'S LIABILITY FOR ROYALTIES AS 
A FEDERAL QUESTION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
By the Amended Decree of July 3G, 1975, the Trial 
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Court, by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, found an implied 
contract to exist hy awarding TIMECO an implied e~clusive patent 
license subject to the condition of paying royalties to Walker 
Bank on total sales of Valve Systems and Cab Latches and parts 
thereof. It cannot be disputed that an e~clusive license, 
or any license, is in effect and in fact, ·a· c·ontra·ct. D"sc·ar 
Barnett Foun·dry Co, v. Crowe, 219 Fed.Rptr. 450, 455 (CCA, 
3rd CKT, 1915), The owner of the patent by contract typically 
licenses or authorizes another to make, use and sell an invention 
in exchange for royalties to be paid by the licensee. Id, 
In this case, the Trial Court imposed the contract 
on unwilling parties by implication, The Trial Court cannot 
now deny jurisdiction to determine the scope of the royalty 
right it awarded to Walker Bank and the scope of the royalty 
obligation it imposed on TIMECO. The contract is extant and 
in the form of a judgment, The United States District Court 
for the District of Utah cannot enforce that judgment or the 
contract therein contained because there is no jurisdictional 
basis for it to do so. First, and most obvious, there is no 
diversity jurisdiction, Second, Walker Bank is not suing TIMECO 
for patent infringement so that jurisdiction would be exclusively 
federal under 28 USC 1338, Rather, Walker Bank is proceeding 
to obtain the contractual benefit and the judgment rights it 
was awarded by the Trial Court under State law. 
A Utah State District Court, and in particular the 
Trial Court herein, has jurisdiction over contract disputes. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3-4 (1953, Vol. 9A}, Even though 
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Federal Court jurisdiction is exclusive in patent matters under 
28 USC 13.38, ·it n:a·s oeen: re:pe·ated1.y h:ela: tha:t' ·a stat·e· caurt 
n:as· jurisdiction· O"(er ·contractual disputes reTatin:g· to patents 1 
· ·an:d ·tna:t' a· ·st·a:te co·u:rt may en:ter't'ain is sues· YeT a ting ·t·o' pat en ts 
· in:d1idihg patent· ·i·n:frihgenient and/or paten:t· Validity if n:ec·es-
sary ·to· ·decide tii.e ·case. 
IIi Luckett v. Delpart,· rn·c. e·t· al, 270 u.s. 495 
(1~261, Chief Justice Taft, without dissent, held that: 
"• •• where a patentee complaintant makes his 
suit one for recovery of royalties under a contract 
of license.,,he does not give the federal district 
court jurisdiction of the cause as one arising under 
the patent laws." 270 u.s. at 510, 
c. f.; Kysor· Industrial Corporation v. ve·t, Inc., 
459 F,2d 1010, 173 USPQ 642 (CCA, 6th CKT, 19721, remanding 
a transferred case to the state court because it sounded in 
contract; 'Lea:r Sie·grer Inc, v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595, 141 USPQ 
327 (CCA, 9th CKT, 1964}, deferring to a state court action 
under a patent license; Lea·r v; Adkins, 395 US 653, 162 USPQ 
1 (1969), is a companion action to Lear Siegler in which remand 
was had to a state court to resolve patent issues. In the 
recent decision of MilpYint Inc.· v; Curwo·od, __ F. Zd 
--· 
1g6 USPQ 147 (CCA, 7th CKT, 1977} (copy affixed as Exhibit 
IIl, a dismissal of a declaratory judgment action for patent 
invalidity and non-infringement was upheld in view of a prior 
pending state court action to recover royalties under a patent 
license. 
TD1ECO itself cannot :fairly deny the accuracy of 
this fundamental precept of law. In a much earlier filed Trial 
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Court document in this case (R-469~4 721, TUIECO asserted that: 
"If questions of patent infringement and validity 
are ancillary to actions arising under contracts 
involving patents, the overwhelming weight of authority 
supports jurisdiction of such questions By a state 
court handling the transaction." (R-470} 
TH1ECO goes on to cite numerous authorities to support this 
proposition. 
In the prior appeal of TIME CO in this Court, TINE CO 
argued at length that the Trial Court had earlier erred because 
TINECO had not been allowed to put on evidence relating to 
patent infringement. Appellant's Brief in Appeal No. 15136, 
at pages 8 through 16. TH1ECO premised this argument on the 
proposition that "a state court may entertain and decide issues 
of patent ••• infringement 1-rhen these are ancillary to contract 
or some other issue under state law." Appellant's Brief in 
Appeal No. 15136, at page 15. The defendants Walker Bank and 
Davis agree. 
Since it is clear that a state court can resolve 
issues relating to patents of the type in this case, and since 
it is clear that the issue below related to the Trial Court's 
own judgment, it >vas clearly erroneous ifor the Trial Court 
to dismiss the question of whether royalties are due on the 
"Black Latch" as a matter for determination in the Federal 
Court, 
If There Are Patent Issues, 
TRey Are AncJ.llary 
The real issue in the Trial Court is whether or not 
the "Black Latch" made and sold by TU1ECO (admitted} is a latch 
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for which royalties are to be paid under the language of the 
Amended Decree of July 3U, lg?s, which requires payment of 
royalties on "total sales,,,o£ Cab latches and parts thereof". 
It would be totally consistent for the Trial Court to receive 
evidence on that issue without ever confronting any patent 
questions. 
However, if patent questions such as patent infringe-
ment were found to be involved, such questions would be totally 
ancillary to the above-stated issue, That is, the Trial Court 
would resolve the issue as a prerequisite to resolving the 
State Court issue on the scope of its own judgment and the 
contractual rights and obligations it imposed on the parties, 
The Law o·f the· Case 
Res Judic·a:ta: LJ.niJ.t 
· Ahy Pate·nr rs·sues 
On May 27, 197$ 1 TIMECO presented a Motion For Summary 
Judgment Of Patent Invalidity (R-564), The motion was denied 
by Judge Sawaya in his Order of June 12, 1975 (R-580-581}, 
This occurred prior to the entry of the final Judgment on July 
30 1 1975, TIMECO did not appeal from the final Judgment, which, 
of course, required TIMECO, inter alia, to pay royalties on 
the total sales of cab latches, 
Nonetheless, TU1ECO has continued to vigorously assert 
a right to re.litigate the issue of patent validity before the 
Trial Court, The law o£ the case is settled, The matter was 
raised before final Judgment and not appealed, 
TU1ECO, of course, vehemently disagrees, TIMECO 
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ha~, at least in the past, presented lengthy and complex argu-
ments that it is entitled to raise the two main patent issues 
of patent infringement, and particularly the issue of patent 
validity. The premise of TIMECO's argument that it is entitled 
to attack the validity of the patent is the widely known doctrine 
that a patent licensee may attack the patent under which the 
license is granted on grounds of patent validity. This doctrine 
finds its genesis in the landmark case of Le·ar v. Adkins, 
The defendants do not quarrel with the vitality of 
the doctrine; but it IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE FACTUAL CONTEXT 
OF THIS CASE. First, TIMECO earlier raised the validity issue 
and obtained an adverse ruling (R-5811. The Lear v, Adki-ns 
doctrine is not one which permits a party to relitigate the 
same issue in the same case. Res· .Judicata does attach to 
validity decisions/adjudications, USM Corp. v. Stand-ard 
Pressed Steel Co., 453 F, Supp. 743, 200 USPQ 788 (D.C. N.D.Ill, 
1978). 
In USl<l Cory. v. Standard Presse-d Steel Co., supra, 
200. USPQ at 793, USM at licensee sought to challenge the val-
idity of the patent of licensor. USM had earlier obtained 
its patent license in a court decree. The Court noted that: 
"Such_ a decree is a judicial act :rather than 
as a cont-.act, Unixe·d -states v, -s,vift- & ·co,, 286 
US 10.6 115, and ~s ~enera:lly accorded fun res 
iudicah effect, On~ted States v. Southern Ute 
nd1ans 4t12 U.S. 1S9., 91 s.Ct, !136, 28 L.Ed, 2d 
695 09hl; 1'fa:Uace Clark & Co., Inc. y, Acheson 
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Industries, Inc., 532 F. 2d 846 1 190 USJ?Q 321 (_2nd CKT, 19761; lB Moore's Federal Practice, Section 
0..4Cl.9j5J "• (emphasis added} zoa USJ?Q at 7SL3. 
The Court then held that ~ judicata precluded USH 
from again raising the issue of patent validity, The law of 
the case and the doctrine of ~judicata preclude further 
litigation on that issue. If this were not followed, a party 
could interminably relitigate decided and final issues. TIHECO 
has so acted in this case re-raising the issue of patent validity 
directly (R-ll3Ul and indirectly (_R-1285}, However, the Trial 
Court has consistently denied all efforts by TIHECO to resurrect 
the issue (R-134 7}. 
Thus, if there are patent issues ancillary to these 
proceedings, the issues are limited to one issue,.,patent 
infringement. That is, the only inquiry that may need to be 
made is whether or not the accused Black Latch is a device 
as defined by the claims of the licensed Brimhall Latch patent, 
Tt Is Appropriate To Compel 
The Exerc1se Uf Jur~sd~c-tlon 
It is the law of the State of Utah that a district 
court may be compelled to exercise jurisdiction when it has 
erroneously declined or refused to take jurisdiction, State 
ex reL Rarnes v, ·sec·o·n·d District Court, et ·al, 36 Utah 296, 
104 Pac, 282 (19091;· Han·soh v. Ive·rs·on, 61 Utah 172, 211 Pac, 
682 (l!l22l; c.£,, Web·er v, SuperioY Court of Los Angeles 
County,_-__ Cal,Zd __ , 348 P,Zd 572 (_1960}; st-ate v. Paul, 
Wasn._. , 1114 P. 2d 745, 746 (19.4U}, 
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In the instant matter, the District Court has declined 
to proceed on the grounds that it lacks jurisdiction" However, 
the District Court does have jurisdiction and should he com-
pelled to proceed" 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants-appellants, Walker Bank and Davis, 
are before this Court seeking an opportunity to present evidence 
to the Trial Court and obtain a ruling such that Walker Bank 
and Davis can obtain the benefit of the bargainooothe contractooo 
imposed by the Trial Court's Amended Decree of July 30, 1975" 
The Trial Court has erred in refusing to follow the 
prior appeal decision of this Court, in refusing to enforce 
its own judgment, and in "getting rid" of this case by finding 
that jurisdiction is in the federal courtso Such action on 
the part of the Trial Court has, in fact, denied defendants-
appellants Walker Bank and Davis due process of lawo They 
are being denied access to the very forum which granted the 
rights they seek to enforce" 
It would be an anomaly, if not a total hon ·s·equitur, 
to force Walker Bank and Davis to proceed in federal court 
to enforce contract rights awarded by a state courto Of course, 
Davis and Walker Bank have no legal jurisdictional or factual 
basis to proceed in Federal Court. Th.us, the Trial Court's 
action, in effect and in fact, denies w:alker Bank and Davis 
the opportunity to enforce the State Court Judgment and bring 
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tQe issue of contempt to the attention of the Trial Court, 
Sue~ a result should not ontain, 
Walker Bank and Davis respectfully urge this Supreme 
Court to reverse the Order of the Trial Court, dated October 
24, 1978, and remand with a clear mandate and direction to 
receive evidence on the issue of whether or not royalties are 
due on the Black Latch, including the issue of contempt, but 
not including the issue of patent validity, Walker Bank and 
Davis also respectfully reguest their costs in this Appeal. 
DATED this ;J JfA day of August, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TRASK & 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS CAR0L BRIMHALL 
DAVIS AND WALKE'< BAN~as mailed, first class, postage prepaid, 
this ;)/("day of , ~ V, 1979, as follows: 
Two copies to Philip A. Mallinckrodt, Mallinckrodt 
& ~allinckrodt, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111; 
Two copies to A. Wally Sandack, Sandack & Sandack, 
370 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111; 
nriginal and ten conies to the Clerk of the Suprefle 
Court of the State of lltah. 
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EARL P. STATIN 
Suite 400, Chancellor Blug. 
220 South Secona East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-7575 
P!ULIP A. 1-'J\LLI:lCKRODr 
10 Exchan~e Place 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-1624 
Attorr.~ys for Plaintiff and. 
Third Party fufendant Brimco 
Hyaraulics & Engineering, Inc. 
Ll THE DISTRICI COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICI 
IN AliD FOR SALT lAKE COUlffl, STAIE OF lJTAH 
TDU: C0:1'!E?CL~L FDIA.'ICI:!G 
CORPOR'\TION, a Utah ccrporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROL BRI!%\l.1...; \·~AL(EP, 8:\l':K & 
TRUST cc:~~Alfi I Au.rnil1istrator t.Jith 
the !,.-Jill ann~:-:eo of the Estate 
of Ray S. Brimhall, acceased, 
ctal 
Defendants 
ond 
'tiALKER EA:,"~ & TRUST COMP!\:iY, 
.Aa:ninistra.tcl"l ~;i th the '.·iill 
arr.c.x~.J of t..'"'tc rs--cate of Ray 
S, Eri:r .. 13.ll, aecca.sca 1 
De.fcndant and 
Thiru Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
BRTI~O ffiT?AULICS & EJ~GDmiNG, 
INC., a COI"?Oration, et al 
Thiro Party Defendants 
Civil No, 1987 52 
bh \ 3'{ NO 3;Jl'1 
't, -5 -15 ~ .:;<.. \_\ At) 
The issues of ownership or other proprietary interest of plain-
tiff in Vnitea States Lette-""'5 Patent ifo. 31 430,653 and United States 
Application for Letters Patent Serial :1o. 732 1 484 came on re0Ularly for 
trial before the Court, ~-Tithout a jury, cor.r.'.encino; Jar.uar: 10, 1972, all 
EXHIBIT~.J:"'=---­
PAGE ---+---
OF __ ..:j:.c...---
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issues respecting liabil~ty ana d.a:na.~?,cs having been res~ea by the Court 
for trial at a future uate; Wrl p. Staten, Craig G, Adamson a'ld. Philip A. 
Mallinckrod.t, appea..'""Ca as COUI"'scl for plaintiff and tlli ... ~ party uefer.dant 
Briroco Hydraulics & Eneincering, Inc.; Earl D. Tar~, appe.arccj for aefcnd-
ants earor &imhall; '.-la.lkcr Bank & Trust Ccmpany, as t'dm:ir.istrator with ':he 
Will annexed of the Estate of P-av S, &imhall, aeceaseo; Stephen D, Schultz 
and Brimhall Products, Inc. ; Clark 1-1. Sessions ~present~ 1.•!lllidr.l Hesterman 
and 4-Spectra, Inc.; defcnaan't John s. Fai.rloar.ks, Jr. aid not: appear bccausc 
of a pleaaing filca hcrcin whereby he assignee! to plaintiff any interest he 
may have had in saia letters Patent: and Patent Application. The matter 
having been pre.serrteo t e'Jia.er:.ce havir.g been tal(en t ar.a. arzunent hav~ been 
sul:mitted to the Cotrt ana consioe.."r"ea, the Court having ;r.aoe ana errtc....~ 
its Fina.ir.gs of Fact and Conclusions of Law hCI"'ein, ana the Court bcir.g 
fully a.avised in the prenises, nO"...r, therefore; 
IT IS HERESY ORDE'<ED, ADJ\J!X;ED AliD DECPJ:m: 
L That the aefcndant 1 • .Jal.kar B3nk & Trust Company, as the au2. v 
app:)inted Administrator with \.Jill Annc.xed of the Estate of ?-a~: S. 3ri.-::r.a22, 
deceased, is t!-te crwner of the legal and equitable title of ' ... T-.it:~ ~":'3:t2~ 
letters Patent: No. 3,430,653, anti the invention acscribea t:~~ir. c.··rt.:..t_~a. 
"Hyaraulics Valve ana Systan" 1 which r..etters Patcmt' vas issued !1arch 4th, 
1969, for a tern of seventeen (17) years. Said patent was and is subject 
to a royalty :ree, persor-.a.l, non-assigr.able lim.i:tca license outsta.Y').din~ 
in the ac.fer.d.ant, 1.~cst~ ~cscarch anc.J. ~~ufacturing Company, rrorc fully 
defined in t..":e settle:ncnt as;recrr.cnt aa.tea !'-~.arch 14, 1969, ar.d of record 
in Civil .Action IIo. 178247 in this Court. 
2. That the d~f enaant l.~alker Bar .. ~( & '!'rust Company, as the said 
/l . a!ninistrator •..rith ',•/ill Anncxeo of the Estate of Ray s. Erin."lall, deceased, 
is thc 01-mcr of 1:hc legal ana equitable title in ar.d to Uni1:cd S1:atcs 
Patent Application Serial tJo. 732 1 484 and the ir.vcnt:ion ocscribca therein 
cntit:lC<J "Hydraulics Syst~ ana ~ec~ical L3.t:ch 'I'r.~for," and letters 
J:d'tcnt 3, 797,392 grar.tec.J unacr said patent application by the Unite:! Stat:es 
Patcrrt Office on 11arch 19, 1972, 
3. 7hat the plaintiff ;:'i';tC CcrT.:crcial Fi.nar-.ci.ng Corporation is 
the a..mcr of an i:r:plica cxclusiv~ license un.uer said :..:ni tea St:atcs Letters 
EXHIBIT I. 
PAGE .l 
= 2. OF l. 
b:-..J 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Patent No. 3,4-30,653 (th2: "Valve System11 invention) and unaer United States 
Patent Application No, 7 32,484 (the "Cab Latch" invoontionl and any letters 
patent granted thereon, said license baing the exclusive right to make, usc, 
and sell saia inventions and the rir)1t to pledge, rrortgage and assip;n said 
license, for purposes of security, for the lives of any letters patent grant-
a:! thereon. In return for saia license, plaintiff Tine CDmncrcial Financing 
Corporation is obligated to pay r.onthly to 'dalker &ink & Trust Company, as 
duly appointe:! Administrator with \iill Annexea of the Estate of Ray S. 
Brimhall, deceased, and its successors and assigns, royalties in the arrount of 
two percent ( 2%) of total sales of Valve Syste:ns ana Cab Latches and parts 
thereof, The payment of said royalties is a condition of said license. To 
assure the accuracy of the calculation and accounting for royalties, recora.s 
of plaintiff, Time Comrcrcial Financ:ir.g Corporation, as r.a.y be necessary to 
an accounting verification of the arrounts of total sales, subject to license, 
shall be made available at reasonable int,;rvals, but not rrore than quarterly, 
for examination by an independent Certifiec.l Public Accountant to be selected 
by the owner of the "Valve System Paterrt 11 and "Cab I..a.tc..'h, Patent." 
4. That plainti£f Tirre CCI!mercial Financing Corporation has made 
payments, or tcnaere<i payments to '.-lalker &ink & Trust Company, as Admin-
istrator with '.·lill annexed of the Estate of Ray S, Brimhall, decease:!, of 
all royalties accrue:! up to and incluaing March 31, 1972, except royalties 
in the sum of $4,844.79 that plaintiff, in good faith, believed had been 
duly tendered, That Tine Comr.crcial Financ:ir.g Corporation has tendered said 
sum of $4,844,79 to ''lalkcr &ink & Trust Company, as A<lministrator with •,.Jill 
Annexea of the Estate of Ray s. Brimhall, <.lcceascd, on the 12th aa.y of June, 
1975, Neither the sufficiency nor toe timeliness of any amount tenaer<ec 
since f'.arch 31,1972 has been adjudicatea herein. 
5. All issues respecting liability for' damages, in::luding defenses 
to plaintiff's claim for darnajjcS and counterclaims, and all issues as to the 
arrotmt of d.a.mages to be awarded ~ithcr party arc res~Y'Vca for furtt-.er proceeo-
.i.ngs herein. 
Da ' :::5/''-/:t "ted this ~my of July, 1975, 
/ /~ I 
3. 
EXHIBIT~I.~--
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[5] The record makes clear that 
appellant was hired bv the corporation to 
produce a menu book, a task for which she 
was to receive one-thtrd of the profits. The 
corporation absorbed all expenses in 
producing the book, and the defendant 
Geldcrman was the motivatln'! force behmd 
the project. Appellant did not- originate the 
project and had no control over the corpora-
tion or its shareholders. Under these cir-
cumstances, appellant has failed to over~ 
come the presumption that the mutual in-
tent or the parties is that the title to the 
copyright shall be in the employer. Accor-
dingly, the judgment of the district coun is 
affirmed. 
Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit 
Milprint, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc. 
No. 77-1049 Decided Sept. 14, 1977 
PATENTS 
1. Infringement- In general (§39.01) 
Jurisdiction of courts- Contracts and 
patent title (§43.15) 
Jurisdiction of courts - Patent in-
fringement ( §43.45) 
There is no exclusive federal junsdiction 
over "questions" aris1ng under patent laws 
and onlv "cases" so arJsJng mav be brought 
in federal courts; suH ansf:s under law that 
creates cause of action, and whde suH for In-
fringement of patent anses under patent 
laws and is therefore cogmzable under 28 
U.S.C. J338(a), suit to eriforce undenak1ne: 
to pay royalties for use of patent anses un~ 
der stare law and JS not w!thmJunsdJctlon of 
federal courts; licensor whose licensee 
breaks agreement 1s entitled to declare 
license for-felted for breach of condinon sub-
sequent and sue for Infringement and. if it JS 
correct as to 1ts nghr to declare forfeiture 
unilaterally, wh1ch IS stare law questton, 
federal jurisdiction of mfnngemenr sun e:o:-
ists; even al\e~atLon <d 1nfnngement. bv 
licensor who stands on license a~reement 
and seeks contr.:tct remedies wdl not create 
fedcraljunsdLctJon, since existence of IH.ense 
bars possibility of infnngement. 
2. Jurisdiction of courts - Patent in-
fringement ( §43.45) 
State courts - Pleading and practice 
( §63.5) 
Defense of patent 1nvalidirv can be 
asserted in state court. wh1ch properlv has 
junsdicnon of revalues sun, 2H L' S.C. 
1338(a) makes federal JUrLsdictlon of cases 
ansm.g under patent laws exclus1ve. 
3. Jurisdiction of courts - Declaratory 
jud~ment - Actual controversy 
( §43.303) 
L1censee's alle15ation that licensor is stand-
ing on license agreement lorecloses 
possibility that licensee fears 1ts nonpav-
ment of royalties v. ill result m licensor 
declaring forfeiture and suin~ for ~nfnn~e­
ment and renders Oeclaratorv Judgment 
Act suit unavailable to licensee. 
4. Jurisdiction of courts - Declaratory 
judgment - In general (§43.301) 
Jurisdiction of courts - Declaratorv 
judgment - Actual controversY 
(§43.303) 
Patent licensee's declaratorv complaint 
that asserts patent invaiJditv to avo1d 
obligations of license, absent d1versuv, does 
not state claim ansing under patent lav.-s 
within meamng of 28 C S.C. 1338!a I; 
Edward Katzmger Co. v. Ch1cago :\.1etallic 
.\Janufactunng Co .. 72 CSPQ 18. does not 
embody 1mphcH hold1ng that licensee can 
invoke federal junsdict1on to test federal 
validity defense; declararorv JUdg_-ment 
plamuff's stake_ must be mterest In avmding 
mfnn~emem ILt!?atton to satJsfv JunsdJC· 
tlOn.Jl requ1rement that case anse under pat-
ent la\' .. s. 
.\ppeal from Distnct Court for Eastern 
Dist:-Jct of \Visconstn, Revnolds, J. 
.\cnon bv .\filpnnt. Inc, a~?atnst 
Cur\..-ood. Inc. for declaratorv JUdgment of 
patent mvaJJdLtV and breach oi l!cense 
a12:reemenrs From order dismLsSLng com· 
pL:unt. plamt1ff appeals. r\ifirmed. 
Donald G. Casser. ~Iii waukee, Wis , for 
appellant. 
DenniS \(. \lc\\'iliiams and James S 
Pnstc!sk1. both of Ch1cago. Ill . for 
appellee. 
Before Pel!. Tone. and \Vood. Circuit 
Judges 
Pell, Circuit Judge. 
EXHIBIT JC 
PAGE _ ____,/,__ __ 
OF £ 
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Appellee Curwood, Inc., is the owner of a 
patent co\'enng a plastic lamtnated film 
product In 1970. Cun\ood advised 
appe-llant :..Iilpnnt, Inc, that H should 
either take a license under the patent or 
prepare for an infnn~ement suit. P.y two 
agreements in April 1971 ~Iilprint took a 
license but reserved 1ts right to contest the 
validuy of the patent In m1d~ 1973, .\lilprint 
ceased making royalty pa\·ments due under 
the license agreement and on .\larch I. 
1976, Curwood instituted an actJon for 
royalties in the Circuit Court of :..filwaukee 
Counrv, \\'Jsconsin. Diversny between the 
panie; being lack1ng. the srat·e court, as \•oill 
be discussed heremafter, was the onlv forum 
available to Curwood. · 
On :'\.larch 22, 1976, :-.lilprint filed in the 
district court a comp!amt seeking a 
declaratory judgment to the effect that 
Curwood's rhen 4 current reissue patent and 
its predecessor were invalid. that no further 
royalties were due Curwood under the 
license agreements, and that ~lilpri!lt was 
entitled to return of the royaltieS paid 
between 1971 and 1973. A separate count of 
the complaint alleged breaches of the 
agreements by Curwood and sought similar 
declarations as to revalues. On April I, 
~1ilprint filed a petition removin~ the state 
court case w the district court. The district 
court remanded the case because it had 
been "removed improvidently and without 
jurisdiction." 28 U.S C. §1447(c).' In the 
same decisJOn and order, the district court 
rejected Curwood 's argument that the case 
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 
but nonetheless dismissed the dec!ararorv 
action because of the pendency of the state 
coun suit. 
~lilprint's appeal attacks only the 
propriety of the district coun 's discretionary 
dismissal, an.d Curwood, apparently 
satisfied \\:tth a dismissal on any ground, has 
not pressed tts JUnsdJctJOnal objection in 
this coun. The objection made in the dis· 
trict coun was that :..lilpnnt 's declaratory 
act10n does not "ans(e) under any Act of 
Congress relating to patents" wHhm the 
1 By unr~port~d order of F'~bruarv 11. 1977, 
this court dtsmtssed :--.ltlpnm ·s appeal from this 
remand order for lack of appeli.1te Junsd!Ctton 
Curwood. lnc v :--.fdpnnL Inc., :\o /7.JOSO See 
28 L:.S.C § 1447(d), Thermtron Products. Inc. v 
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976). 
meaning of 28 U.S C §!338(a)' The dis-
tncr coun was of the view that the action 
"manifestlr does" so arise. Because the 
mau er does n01 seem to us to be so simple, 
we must first decide whether the district 
court had junsdiction of the case. See Arvin 
l~dusrries. Inc \'. Berns Air Kin~ Corpora· 
t1on, 510 F.2d 1070, 1072, 185 lJSPQ 7, 8 
(7th Cir. 1975). 
f1 J It has long' been clear, not withstand· 
ing 1he substantial federal interest in pat· 
cnt matters. that there 1s no exclusive 
federal jurisdiction O\er qurrtwns arising un· 
der the paten.t lav.·s. only casu so arising may 
be brought m the federal couns. Pratt v. 
Pans Gas Li~ht & Coke C.ompany, 168 U.S. 
255, 259 (1897) Consistent "ith the oft-
cited principle stated by Justice Holmes in 
American \\'ell Works Co. v Layne & 
Bowler Co, 241 L:S. 257, 260 (1916) (in 
which patent jurisdiction was asserted), that 
"[a] suit anses under the law that creates 
the cause of action," it is well established 
that 
["":]hile a suit for infringement of a patent 
anses under the patent laws and is 
therefore cognizable under 28 V S.C. 
§ 1338(a), a suit ro enforce an undenaking 
to. pay royalr 1es for the use of a patent 
anses under state law and 1s not within 
rhe jurisdiction of tne federal couns. 
Albright v Teas, 106 l' S 613 
(1883\ Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 lJ.S. 
496, SJO. (1926). 
Arvin Industries, supra, 510 F.2d at 
1072-73. 185 L:SPQ at 7-9' ..\.patent licen-
sor \vhose licensee has broken the agreement 
is not Without ch01ce between a state and a 
federal forum. It can. for example, declare 
the license forfeited for breach of a condition 
subsequent and sue for infrin~emem. If it is 
1 Section 1338(a) provides: 
The district couMs shall have original 
junsdiwon of anv civd action ansing under any 
.l.ct of Congress re!aun~ to pat ems, plant vane· 
tr protect JOn, copvn~h!S and trademarks. Such 
JUrisdicuon shall be exclusi,·e of the courts of 
the states m patent, plant variety protection 
and cop)'flght cases. 
) Under these principles, there can be no doubt 
that the count of ~[dprinr's compL:11nt which 
alle~es Curwood's breaches of the license agree-
ment and seeks. thus. a declaration that ~Iilprint 
JS entitled to return of alre~dy paid royahies. ha! 
no JUnsdtcuonal s1~mficance. This count sounds 
exclus1veh· 1n contract, and, unlike the other 
coum, dot-s not even assen the existence of patent 
law 1ssues. 
EXH !BiT--=Jf""""'--
p :.\GE ---'-"='---
Or __ __.~!!-----
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correct as to its right to declare such a 
forfeiture unilaterally (a question of state 
law) federal jurisdiction of the infrin15cmem 
suit exists. Luckett v De!park, Inc., supra, 
270 U.S. at Stl. But where the licensor 
stands on the license agreemenr and seeks 
conttact remedies, even an allegation of in-
fringement will no~ create fedel-ai JUnsdJC· 
tion, for the existence of the license 
precludes the possibility of infnngement. 
Arvin lndusrnes, supra, 510 F.2d at 1073, 
185 USPQ at 8-9. 
[2) These principles lead straight to the 
conclusion that Curwood's state court 
royalties suit, diversity be1ng absent. could 
have been brought nowhere else but m a 
state coun. Curwood's suit 1s a prototypal 
one of a cause that arises under state. not 
federal patenr, law • .\1J!prmr's assert tons 
that the underlying patents are invalid could 
be asserted by way of defense m the stare 
court. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 39j t.:.S. 
653, 669-71, 676, 162 t.:SPQ I, 7-8, 10 
(1969). 
The questions at hand are whether 
Milprim's action does anything more rhan 
seek to establish what would be its defenses 
in the state court revalues action, and. if 
not, whether the DeciJ.ratory Judgment .-\ct. 
28 U.S. C. §2201, somehow allo"s ~lilprim 
to test a defense in federal court that could, 
without the Act, only be raised 10 state 
court. 
[3) We answer the first question in the 
negative. As we have remarked. the second 
count of the complaint, which asserts 
something akin to a traditional rescission 
cause of act1on, must be disregarded for 
jurisdictional purposes. See n.3 s'upra The 
balance of the compiamt, while 1t (lssens the 
invalidity of Curnood's patents. Js entlrelv 
geared to the rovaltv dispute. The exiSience 
of the license agreements. and a l?enerahzed 
statement of their terms, are alleged, but 1t 
is nowhere stated that the license has been 
terminated by en her panv. In fact, the com· 
plaint specifically avers the ex1stence of 
Curwood's pending state court sun to en-
4 It should be r~a!led here rhar 28 L' ~ ,-. 
§t338(a) makes federal Junsdtctton of c.1ses .ms-
ing under the patenr la...,s rulur~:·r Absf'nt dnersl-
ly, the propriety of a state forum set" e e- Lear. 
supra, necessanlv tmphes the noncXJ.Stf'nce of 
f~deral jurisdtctton. See C.h1sum. The .\lloc;HLon 
ofjurisdiwon bet .... ·een .Statf' and Ff'derJI Courts 
in Pat~nl LJtJgaJtOn, 46 \\'ash. L. Rev 6JJ, 670 
(1970). 
force payment of rovalt1es. The reltd 
sou~ht, other than a declarauon of rarenr 
1nvaiJdHy and of the nghts of the parttes un· 
der the license a~ree-menr. ts spectfica!ly 
atmed at elimmatJng \fdpnnr ·s rova,ty 
obliG;attons Th1s 1s. thus. a qune du.inent 
case than would be presenred bv a com-
plaint al!e~tng that a licensee's nonpayment 
of royalties 'Save u reason to fear the bcensor 
would declare a forfeiture and sue for tn· 
fnngement By a!legtng that Curwood ts 
standmg on the license a~reement. :'-.1dpnnt 
forecloses that poss1bility See Arvm In· 
dustries, supra, jiO F.2d at 1073, 185 
L'SPQ at 8-9. Thiokol Chemical Corporo-
tion v. Burlington Industnes. Inc 448 F 2d 
1328, 13JOn.2, 171 LSPQ193, 194DdCir 
19'1). cert demed. 404 L' S 1019. 172 
L'SPQ 257 (1972) In fact. the v.ord "in-
fnngement" does not even appear 10 the 
complamt For purposes of JUnsdictton. 
then. this case is nothtng more than 
.\1ilpnnt 's attempt to use th-e Dec!aratorv 
Judgment Act to estab!tsh a federal defense 
to an acuon grounded exclus1velv 10 state 
law, which could onlv be and has been 
brought in state court. 
\Ve belie\e the attempt must faiL The Act 
provides. 28 t.: S C. §2201, that" [l)n a case 
of actual controversv Wilhtn 1ts IUrtsdictwn 
any court of the Cnited sCares 
may declare the rights and other legal 
relations of any interested panv seekmg 
such declaration " (Emphasts 
supplied.) By its terms, the Act makes 
declaratory judgment JUnsd!Ct!On depen· 
dent on the traditional ~rants of J unsdicuon 
by which conventional coerc1ve suus would 
be Judged. 
"[T)he operation of the DeclaratorY 
Jud~ment :\.ct 1s procedural onlv ·· .-\emJ 
Life Ins. Co. v Hawonh. 300 l' S 227 
240 [193") Congress enlareed the ranee 
of remedtes avatbble 10 the federal courts 
but did nor extend the1r JUf!SdJctlon. 
Skelly Od Co. v. Phd lips Petroleum Co., 339 
L'.S. 667. 671 (19jO) 
In Skelly Oil, the declaratorv plamufT 
sought to ha\·e its nght to contract perfor-
mance adjudicated The defendants hJd 
stated thev \\Ould not pen"orm because the 
contract "as condtnoned on the tssuance 0! 
a Fedrrrtl Po,\er Comm1ssJon centt'icate of 
pub tic com emence and necess!lv to p1a1n· 
t1ff. whtch h.1d. ll \\.15 <;a!d not been 1ssued 
10 ttme The comola1nt alleged that the ccr-
tlftcate had bCen "1ssue-d" tn ttme 
~otwuhstand1ng that the ume of tssuance of 
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the certificate was a federal law question 
critical 10 plainrifrs recovery, and that the 
dispute thereon had to be pleaded to es-
tablish a ln·e controversy. the Supreme 
Coun held there was no federal jurisdiction, 
in accordance wnh the long-established rule 
that the pla1ntifrs cla1m must present a 
federal question without reference to an-
ticipated defenses. Id. at 672; see Louisville 
and i\'ashnlle Railroad Company v. 
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) The Coun 
stated: 
To sanction suits for declaratory relief as 
within the jurisdiction of the District 
Courts merely because, as in this case, 
artful pleading anticipates a defense bas-
ed on federal lav .. · would contravene the 
whole trend of JUrisdictJOnallegislaoon by 
Congress, disregard the effecti\'e func· 
tioning of the federal judicial system and 
distort the limited procedural purpose of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act See 
Developments in the Law- Declaratory 
Judgments - 1941-1949, 62 Harv. L. 
Rev. 787, 802-03 (1949). 
339 U.S. at 673-74. 
Here, unlike Skelly Oil, the federal 
"defense" is asserted as the claim of the 
declaratory plaintiff. Procedurally, of 
course, this IS pan of what the Declarator.• 
Judgment Act IS all about, but we think the 
jurisdictional prtnciples should be the same. 
The Skelly Court apparently agreed. The 
very portion of the Harvard Law Re\'lew 
Comment cited approvingly by the Coun 
reached the conclusion that a declaratory 
action seeking to test a defense should be 
triable in the federal courts only if it would 
normally arise m ansv .. ·er to a complamt 
which itself would properly raise a federal 
question. CHing the same Comment. the 
Court in Public Service Commission of L"tah 
v. \VvcoiT Companv. Inc., 344 C.S. 237, 248 
(19;2), observed that "[w[here the com-
plaint in an action for declaratory judgment 
seeks in essence to assert a defense to an 1m· 
pending or threatened state court actto~. it 
is the character of the threatened action, 
and not of rhe defense. wh1ch will determine 
whether there is_ federal-~uesuon jurisdic· 
tion in the Distnct Court. • 
[4) In our opinton the logic of Skellv Oil 
and \\'vcoff controls this case. his true. that 
the De'clarawry Judgment Act does allow 
cases to be brought 1n federal courts whtch 
would not, for lcu:k of a proprr c~rcu .. •t rtmtdy, 
otherwise be there. But It would be 
anomalous to conclude that an Act wh1ch 
provides only fnoadu.ral and rrmtdtallleXJbili· 
ty somehow allows a party to invoke federal 
question JUnsdiction to adjudicate its 
federal defense to an exdusn·ely state law 
action. Accordmglv. we hold that where 
ci1versity ts lacking, a patent licensee's 
declaratory complamt wh1ch asserts patent 
in\'alidity simply to avoid the oblig;:uions of 
the license does not state a claim arising un· 
der the patent laws withm the meaning of28 
L: S.C. §1338(a).' The Third Circuit has 
flatly so held, Thiokol Chemical Corpora-
tiOn, supra, 448 F.2d 1328, 171 l!SPQ 193, 
and the Tenth Circuit in Product Engineer~ 
ing and :....tanufacturing_ Inc v. Barnes, 424 
F.2d 42, 16; L:SPQ 229 (lOth Cir. 1970), 
while considering the jurisdictional issue in 
conjunction with a discretionary dismissal 
issue much as is presented here, with some 
resulting loss in conceptual clarity, did ex· 
pressly afrirm the district court's conclusion 
that an action virtually identical to this one 
"was purely a contract action which proper· 
ly should be litigated in the State coun." !d. 
at 43, 16; L:SPQ at 229.' 
I Because the importance or respecting 
jurisdictional limits often leads federal couns to 
cxammc their JUnsdJctJOn even where the part1es 
do not quest1on it, 11 m:ght be argued that 
Edward Katzin~er Co v. Chicago .\.letallic 
~lanuiacrunng Co .. 329 L! S 394, 72 CSPQ tB 
(1947), embodu~s an impliCit hold1ng that a 
licensee can mvoke federal JUnsdiction to r~ a 
federal vahdm- defense. We thmk u doe's not. for 
three reasons.' First, the declararorv platntdT ,n 
Karzm~er had n01 only ceased rovaitv ').Jvments 
but had also termmated the license and sou~hr 
declarauon not only of inval1diry but also or nOn-
infringement. Second, even tf this were not so, we 
doubt- that anv such implicit and unconsidered 
"hold1ng" surnved Ske!ly Od and Wycoff. Third, 
diversny junsdicoon may. for all that appears, 
ha\·e ex1sted in Katzm~?er The existence of diver· 
suy JUfiSOJctlon, wh1ch is shown by court records 
but not mentioned 10 the opimons, explains this 
court's unquest10n1nt?' acceptance of junsdiction 
tn two recent declara10rv actions bv licensees, 
US.\. I Coroorauon \' S!andard Pressed Steel Co., 
524 F 2d 1.097, 188 CSPQ 52 17th Cir. 1975); Jnd 
Beckman Instruments. Inc. v Techn1cal Develop· 
mem Corporatton. 433 F 2d 55. 167 L.'SPQ 10 
(7th Ctr. 1970), ce".demed, 401 u.S. 976, 169 
CSPQ 65 (1971) 
• Indeed, thu court has recently indicated the 
result ,.,e reach today. In Super Products Cor· 
poration v D P Way Corporatton, 546 F.ld 748, 
753 n.S. 192 CSPQ 417.420-421 (7th Cir. 1976), 
a case pnmarily concerned w1th the existence of a 
real case or comrO\'ersy, it was obsen>ed, citing 
Tluokol. supra, that 
[t]he plamtiff's stake must be an interest in 
av01 dtn!O!; 1njnngrmtnJ /Jt1gat1on or rhe threat of 
such lltla:at10n to sausfy the. . jurisdictionaJ 
requlfe~ent that the case arise under the pat· 
ent Jaw jEmphas1s supplied.j 
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We have considered and found without 
merit other issues raised by ~filprint in· 
eluding the contentions that it is an Jmposl-
tion on a state judicial system to require its 
judges to resolve complex issues under 
federal patent statutes With wh1ch thev are 
generally unfamiliar and that there are 
potential discovery limitations at the state 
forum level. Aside from the fact that Y\t are 
cognizant of frequent federal judicial 
recognition of the concurrent ability of state 
courts to handle difficult le~Sal questions in· 
eluding federal constitutional ones. we are 
unaware of any basis in con ten nons such as 
those presently urged for according- JUnsdic-
tion to a court when that jurisdiction does 
not otherwise exist. 
Although our reasons differ from those 
used by the distrtct coun, we conclude that 
the judgment of dismissal must be, and u 
hereby is, affirmed. 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
In re Baker Industries, Inc. 
No. 77-575 Decided Dec. 8, 1977 
TRADEMARKS 
1. In general (§67.01) 
Company name that serves to identify 
applicant is without sJgmficance for es-
tablishing trademark. 
2. Acquisition of marks- Character and 
extent of usc - [n general 
(§67.0731) 
Slogan that does not identify and dis-
tinguish applicant's goods from those 
manufactured or sold bv others, but rather 
serves to distinguish aPplicam from other 
companies having similar name IS not 
registrable as trademark. 
Appeal from Patent and Trademark Of-
fice Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 
193 USPQ 122. 
Application for re~istra{lon of tr;tdemark 
of Baker lndustnes.lnc, Senal :\o •21.1•1 
From decisiOn refuSJn'! regtstrallon. appli-
cant appeals. Affirmed, Lane, Jud~e, con-
curring in result. 
Albert L. Ely, Jr, and F:Iv & Golrick. both 
of Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant. 
Joseph F. Nakamura !Fred W Sherlin~. of 
counsel) for CommissiOner of Patents and 
Trademarks. 
Before ~[arkev, Chief Judge, and Rich, 
Baldwm, Lane, and .\ld!er, Associate 
Judges. 
Baldwm, Judge. 
This is an appeal from the decision of the 
Trademark Tnal and Appeal Board (T-
T,\B), 193 LSPQ 122 (1976). demmg 
reg-istratiOn on the Pnnc1pa! Re'2JSter ol the 
wOrds "The Prmccttve Ser.1ce ·comoanv" 
in applicanon senal ~o J2 i .1.+1 filed Apr! I 
12, !972, for decrncal and/or eiecrronJc 
sensing, transmittmg:, and alarm m;nal 
dev1ces. The TTAB based Its decJsJon on the 
ground that the words neither 1dentl!v the 
source of the goods nor dJstm~uJsh the 
goods from other such goods 1n accordance 
with the definHwn of ''trade-mark" set forth 
in section 45 of the Lanham .-\ct 
(Trademark Act of 1946).' \Ve affirm. 
During the prosecution, appc!l~nt 
presented spccJmens. postal meter madmg 
tapes, which showed the actual use of the 
words in commerce The mailing tapes are 
affixed to packages m wh1ch appellant ·s 
goods are mailed. The words. wh1ch 
appellant argues are m the nature of a 
slogan, are used on the packages m conJunc-
tion with appellant's trade name. Baker In-
dusrries. Appellant further argues that the 
slo~an distinguishes the goods 10 accor-
dance with reqUirements of secuon 4S. 
Opinion 
In their briefs before the court. both par-
ties cited In re \\'alker Process Eou10ment 
Inc., 43 CCPA 913. 233 F 2d 329. 110 
LSPQ 41 (1956) (hereinafter cued as 
\Valker). \\"a!ker tnvolved an attempt to 
regrster ··\Valker Process Equ1pment Inc.·· 
as a trademark The facts show that :IllS 
phrase was used m conJuncnon ..., 1th ·· P:-o-
quip," a registered trademark Re~ardm~? 
the issue of whether the company n.Jme 
served also as a tradcm<~.rk to tdenuh and to 
distinguish appclbnt ·s goods. the court con-
cluded that the companv name \\.lS not so 
used. A sJe:ntficant fact \\htch supported the 
conc!us1or1 \\as placement oi appellant ·s .10-
d.ress \\Jth the comoanv name Thl" tnclu-
ston of the addres~ more fully 1dentdied 
' 15 uSC 1127. 
t:Xri·BIT _;g;;__. 
"•('C: L-,j·;·_~_.L-
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